Abstract
A systematic discourse analysis of the recent EU MSS or its action plan is not offered here. Nonetheless, as a document, it is obviously replete with language that fits the softer end of the maritime security spectrum.
There is much less of the hard security talk we might expect from organisations such as NATO. For example, the MSS text contrasts sharply with NATO's statement on maritime strategy (2011), which has an entire section devoted to 'deterrence and collective defence'.
2 One can also contrast the EU MSS with the recent British National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) (HMG 2014) . While this document has a great number of references to international law, upholding norms and keeping maritime trade free, it also has a very clear statement that the purpose of the UK's NSMS is to further British national interests. Moreover, it uses a coherent risks assessment, which notably creates a hierarchy of risks to be prioritised, with marine terrorism near the top.
As a document, the EU MSS can be described as somewhat rambling, reflecting classic liberal security rhetoric, and certainly does not offer any clear strategic choices. It purports to identify common maritime security interests for the EU, but these are widely pitched. For example, they include:
'the protection of economic interests, including the safeguarding of maritime energy resources' alongside 'the protection of the environment and the management of the impact of climate change in maritime areas and coastal regions, as well as the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity to avoid future security risks' (Council 2014: 7) . The fact that extracting oil at sea may be in profound conflict with climate change concerns is entirely glossed over. In short, it is a rather typical 'curate's egg' of an EU document-by-committee.
It is certainly not an exercise in naval strategy for brute hegemony. The text states EU maritime actions are to be 'based on the EU's founding values of human rights, freedom and democracy' and 'Maritime security is understood as a state of affairs of the global maritime domain, in which international law and national law are enforced, freedom of navigation is guaranteed and citizens, infrastructure, transport, the environment and marine resources are protected ' (Council 2014: 3) . The only hegemony sought here is that of liberal norms. Moreover, while protecting EU maritime, borders are mentioned; this is not against hostile states or terrorists but 2 See: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm 'in order to prevent and counter cross-border illegal activities ' (Council 2014: 7) . Somewhat confusingly, the document shortly afterwards shifts to language closer to hard security. It states the EU must attend to 'threats to the security of European citizens and to economic interests at sea following acts of external aggression including those related to maritime disputes, threats to Member States' sovereign rights or armed conflicts' (Council 2014: 7) . Terrorism and CBRN 3 risks are included on the same page as 'Illegal and unregulated archaeological research and pillage of archaeological objects' (Council 2014: 8) . The EU MSS is supposed to be about managing all of these diverse issues and more.
There are only oblique references to the deployment of 'harder security' assets in the EU MSS. Consider, for example, the following statements:
'Member States' Armed Forces should play a strategic role at sea and from the sea and provide global reach, flexibility and access that enable the EU and its Member States to contribute to the full spectrum of maritime responsibilities. Their sustained presence needs to support freedom of navigation and contributes to good governance by deterring, preventing and countering unlawful and illicit activities within the global maritime domain' (Council 2014: 10) . There is also reference made to NATO, but an ambiguous formula is used: 'the EU should act autonomously and with international partners. Special attention should be given to the development of partnerships with international organisations. The Union's capacity to cooperate with the UN, NATO, regional partners like the African Union or ASEAN, as well as multilateral civil cooperation platforms, has a direct impact on its ability to safeguard its interests and to strengthen regional and international maritime security. In the context of crisis management, EU and NATO engagement in the maritime domain should remain complementary and coordinated, in accordance with the agreed framework of the partnership between the two organisations' (2014: 10).
In a way, this text is clear in what it doesn't say. It is not stating that there will be an EU maritime security capability developed apart from NATO.
Nonetheless, a capability to act autonomously is implied by textual references to 'full spectrum' or 'armed forces', which suggests the possibility of the use of force at sea in the EU's name. However, the rest of the MSS is a rhetorical tour de force of liberal, soft security approaches. (Catalano 2015: 119-120 ).
An enormous amount of speculation was generated by the creation of an EU 'force catalogue' for the Helsinki Headline Goals and naval forces featured strongly in that paper exercise. The controversy surrounding the creation of an EU Rapid Reaction Force came mostly to nothing of real institutional value (Whitman and Wolf 2012: 12 The puzzle of lethal force
Third, there is a puzzle over why the EU to date has engaged in only very limited use of force at sea, certainly less than has been encountered by EU military missions on land, where, for example, the EU now seems in Mali to be engaged in 'counter-insurgency by proxy' (Skeppström et al. 2015) . It is true that in 2012 at least one dramatic raid was launched by EUNAVFOR elements on beached pirate skiffs. There have been other encounters at sea where force has been used, but most of these have been smallscale incidents. Interestingly, the exact composition and nationality of the elements used in the beach raid of May 2012 have been kept confidential (to prevent harm to hostages of the same nationality). Thus, responsibility for the operations was given to 'EU forces' rather than specific national contingents. If things had gone horribly wrong (say, children killed) to whom would responsibility have been attributed -EU diplomats or some luckless national contingent and chain-of-command 'responsibility'?
By way of contrast with these limited violent incidents, some national navies, such as the British or French, have been recently involved in quite intensive naval warfare in the second Gulf War (2003) or the Libya intervention of 2011. They have been sinking 'enemy vessels', conducting amphibious raids and landings (Wollert 2013 However, Brexit would seem to imply that the Northwood command centre outside London will no longer be used as an EU command centre, as it is today (although its NATO significance will remain). Brexit seems to also imply future EU missions will also lose the leadership and experience of In contrast, the liberal school of IR theorists would not be surprised that the EU has not developed 'hard' maritime security. For them, 'normative power Europe' has simply gone to sea. The MSS of 2014 has thus taken the rather typical medley of liberal security conceptions and translated them to marine and naval settings. However, the puzzle here is the disconnect. This signifies, from more material, EU maritime interests and the utility of force to uphold international norms in extreme cases, notably the controversial 'right to protect' doctrine.
By making such an emphasis on upholding the rule of international law as the primary objective of it's own maritime security strategy, the EU sets rather obvious snares for itself if the regime of international law is actually quite complex and contested or given to manipulation by great powers who do not share European interpretations.
To cite an example already mentioned, the UN authorization for an EU Such scenarios reveal the EU has material and territorial interests in marine security that may conflict with the rule-of-law norms that the EU preaches, and central to that problem is also a fundamental evasiveness over the use of force in the EU's MSS. As has been explained, the MSS text does not make very clear how, when, and where the EU will actually fight to get what it wants regarding EU maritime security. Admittedly, the document does not state that EU marine security operations will be contingent on UN mandates, but the references to international law and regimes are so extensive that they would make any unilateral European action at sea seem an obvious contradiction with the logic of 'normative power' Europe.
Another interpretation is that unilateral military interventions in such scenarios, if they were truly needed (say, because no lawful alternative could be found), would be simply left to other actors. The EU, as a liberal normative security regime, would then stand down, as rougher elements (NATO or a coalition of the willing) would turn up to fight with or without UN mandates if need be. In some ways, this means the EU maritime security regime has painted itself into a corner, in contrast to the assertion in much of the literature on liberal normative IR approaches, which stresses the imperialistic ambitions of the approach to expand and be widely applied (Doyle 1986; Schimmelfennig 2001) .
A Neo-Medieval Perspective on the EU and the EUMSS
How then are we to make sense of these puzzles? This paper offers the 'neo-medieval' perspective as an alternative IR tradition that can make sense of the EU's puzzling foray into maritime security, especially of the 'softer' style it seems mostly, for now, to encompass. Central to this is the bold claim that the EU might best be understood as a 'neo-medieval Empire' in contrast to academic views, which hold the EU to the standard of being something like a Westphalian state actor, or on the way to being such. This body of work is today most clearly associated with the writings of Jan Zielonka (2006) , however, its antecedence is usually traced back to some comments made by Hedley Bull in his 'Anarchical Society ' (1977) ,
where he imagined in the future: 'sovereign states might disappear and be replaced not by a world government but by a modern and secular equivalent of the kind of universal political organisation that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle Ages. In that system no ruler or state was sovereign in the sense of being supreme over a given territory and a given segment of the Christian population...' (Bull 1977: 254) .
It is important to point out that Bull only sketched out the neo-medieval idea as metaphor, which is how it is used to explain the complexity of the EU today. He did not in fact think states had yet lost their sovereignty to the extent that a genuine neo-medieval order was really upon us. This is important, because a neo-medieval perspective does not have to involve the claim that nation states do not continue to matter, when they clearly do. Not much would happen regarding EU naval or maritime security efforts without the French, Germans, and the British nation states, but it is surely not reducible to their bargaining and interests alone. Moreover, strong national maritime interests and institutions, despite rumours of their demise, remain coherent and highly capable actors. Instead, the central claim, as Zielonka puts it, is that the EU is unlikely to become itself a cohesive federal Westphalian state, principally because of the absence of common demos. The result is a polity that partly builds on existing nation states but also goes well beyond this and in ways that are confusing.
Rennger (2006) adds another dimension of the invocation of neomedievalism by suggesting that while a de-centring of political authority is the central phenomenon of note, this 'new world' will also be post-modern and, therefore, replete with ethical and normative conflict in the absence of shared ethical meta-narratives (Rennger 2006: 64-66) . Foreign policy-makers will have their post-modern work cut out for them, pitching justifications and legitimacy to such a diverse 'audience'. So while there may be a broad consensus on a mix of democracy, markets, and rule of law within the EU polity, there may not be much else by way of shared values. The implications of this are not immediately obvious for the EU's marine security strategy, but it means that agreement on the 'wrongs and
rights' of what that policy is supposed to address may be elusive. Certain issues (piracy) may enjoy broad disdain, but other topics may be more divisive, for example, whether boat people should be seen as a 'threat to borders' or 'victims to be saved at all costs'.
It is worth clarifying the neo-medieval perspective a little before we attempt to extract implications from it for the EU's maritime security policy.
First, we can dispose of some misconceptions. There is no literal claim that the EU has become a new Holy Roman Empire, or that it actually is a replay of medieval political pathologies. Instead, the point is there are functional analogies between the medieval system and the polity the EU has become today. For example, the borders of the EU are somewhat unclear, just like many borders were in medieval times, although not exactly in the same way.
Some EU states keep pretty 'hard', rigidly policed borders (as we are seeing in the case of Hungary), but these are being challenged, contested, and negotiated from below (by people movements) and above (by the EU itself, as we see being played out in Hungary). Moreover, what polity is 'in' and what polity is 'out' of the wider spheres of influence of the EU is vague and shifts. Accession agreements are signed, but progress and entry is far from automatic. Croatia was left waiting for 10 years in a limbo-like pre-accession status before being permitted to become a full member. The entire Western
Balkans is a question mark as to what extent all, or just some, of the various states there will join the EU, or when they will do so: 10 years or 20 years from now? Equally, Brexit puts the stability of the EU's western borders in question, for example, raising issues of Scottish and, perhaps, Catalan independence.
As we have seen before, those countries that actually participate in EU policies and hold to EU norms are much wider than the list of member states. In EUNAVFOR, Norway was a significant and valuable presence, as she is the FRONTEX missions today, although she is not at all an EU member state and looks most unlikely to become one anytime soon. Yet her participation is so extensive in EU affairs that Norway is routinely described as a 'stealth' member state. Small but politically significant contributions were made by other non-member states. This type of 'fuzziness' is so ubiquitous as to be a 'norm'.
Moreover, according to Zielonka, there is likely to be considerable flux about EU borders in a way that echoes medieval practices of suzerainty.
Turkey was 10 years ago considered to be on a progressive track for membership. However, that pathway was until recently stalled, and only in 2015 was it resuscitated. Whether the EU is or is not committed to anything more than association, status for the Ukraine and Moldova remains vague.
Such opacity about the limes of the EU's empire constitutes a reality that justifies the sobriquet 'neo-medieval'.
Another confusion concerns whether the neo-medieval analogy implies anarchy, chaos, or to what extent such an order would be stable. While
Bull clearly implied that the decline of states would produce a certain amount of chaos before a new order was reconstituted, the wider neomedieval literature is careful not to suggest that a neo-medieval polity is chaotic, internally disordered, or incapable of patterns of coercion on 'subjects' and constituent polities. The medieval realm, after all, had strong forces that imposed some cohesiveness. The 'unity of Christendom', as historian Maurice Keen used to style it, was one normative force (Keen 1991) . Today it has been suggested that wide consensus on some form of regulated market capitalism, together with liberal democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights provide a secular equivalent (Friedrichs 2001 ).
However, it would be very wrong to infer that a neo-medieval polity such as the EU is conversely always a settled project. Collapse and breakup are possible outcomes (Zielonka 2014) . For one thing, the EU's boundaries and extent are, as we have seen, somewhat unclear. I think an important part of the neo-medieval description of the EU is that its future trajectory is not settled. Membership is fluid. The Union's borders to the east and in the Mediterranean are liable to shift and be contested. The EU will, like all empires, display ambitions to expand its extent, influence, and power.
There will also be countervailing internal forces, voices, and interests who seek to reign in ambition and return the EU to a smaller project, less imperial, more territorially cohesive, less complex, costly, and risky. Both impulses will to and fro, and we should expect such dynamics to play out in discrete domains, such as EU maritime security policy.
It should also be clear, after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, that the expansion of the EU will be externally contested by other imperial powers, using a mix of hard and soft power. China has threatened to ground EU aircraft and cancel Airbus orders when the EU attempted extra-territorial regulation of aircraft emissions trading. Russia has deployed naval and air assets menacingly in rather traditional Cold war ways, a move that NATO rather than the EU has seen fit to respond to through a policy of 'military confidence building'. NATO has also staged elaborate BALTOPS exercises in 2015 and 2016, to reassure the very nervous Baltic States. These have included aggressive scenarios that envisage amphibious landings to counter a Russian occupation. The EU's maritime security strategy here is ominously silent. Moreover, its relevance to such hard security threats is seemingly minimal.
Conclusion: Implications from the Neo-Medieval Perspective for EU Maritime Security
To extract possible implications from the neo-medieval perspective, we can utilize two essays by Jan Zielonka (2011 Zielonka ( , 2013 , where he considers the EU as an actor in the international system. First, he observes that the polycentric nature of EU decision-making means that the EU finds it difficult to articulate and execute a unified common policy unless over valence issues 16 , which command wide support (2011: 289) . Piracy at sea is obviously such a valence topic. Who could not be against it? What other maritime security problem could draw in the Chinese, Asian, European, the US, and even Russian navies, all to work together off Somalia? Seen this way, EUNAVFOR's success is not so remarkable, and we can suggest if the issue was one not given to consensus (say, a second intervention into Libya) then the EU would find it much harder to agree to deploy and execute a more-controversial maritime security mission.
Second, the EU is mostly a civilian power, which does not mean she has no military means but rather that using such is (a) not the preferred option, and (b) because the EU's military power is shallow and brittle, it has to be used selectively, otherwise it will very likely fail, which generates important feedback de-legitimising the EU. Zielonka's core insight here is that the EU's 'hard' military power is essentially limited, even if an impressive plethora of peace-keeping and constabulary-like missions have been undertaken, such as EUNAVFOR. The result is an EU polity with 'ace cards', at best, being the hard economic instruments of trade deals and market access. This makes the EU likely to back down when faced with a serious military challenge.
Instead the reflex is to use the EU's economic power instead. We see as much over the evolving EU row over the extent, severity, and possible relaxation of sanctions against Putin's role in the ongoing Ukraine crisis.
However, these features should logically make the EU a discriminating actor that would want to choose when, where, and how to deploy force at sea with some care. It has to, because it has to husband what limited maritime capabilities it has. Any mistakes could be fatal for the stability of what is a new and still-unproven security regime. This insight suggests we should predict caution rather than boldness from the EU maritime security regime. This partly explains why we had to wait till EUNAVFOR in 2008 for the major debut of a distinctively EU-branded maritime operation, and why Operation Sophia has evolved tentatively, despite some ambitious staff planning that imagined something much more robust.
Related to this, what we would not expect is that the EU will lurch towards developing hard naval power to balance its soft normative side, as realists suppose. Instead, what is of more interest is how the EU MSS seems 'doomed' to skirt the 'grey zone' of intermediate levels of force.
In this respect, one could be optimistic that the EU might offer a niche of capabilities to engage in less-lethal and more-nuanced forms of force at sea. This is something that NATO can do, but it may sap and undermine NATO's focus on intensive war-fighting roles at sea. I have previously argued that NATO and the EU should consider a functional division of labour, whereby the EU deliberately should develop its soft maritime security capabilities and leave proper naval defence roles to NATO or the national level (Flynn 2015 However, if at the same time the Mediterranean faces an unprecedented human security emergency, then clearly the EU's maritime security policy has to make some hard but obvious geopolitical choices about where it will devote its attentions and capabilities. Consider that the Italian Navy and Coastguard, augmented by ships from other countries, were rescuing around 9,000 people a week and, in some 24-hour periods, thousands of people during 2015 (Patalano 2015: 17) . That magnitude of a problem requires the EU's MSS to either step up and become involved or risk being seen as irrelevant. We can see this geopolitical tension playing out already. As ships and assets are pooled to help FRONTEX deal with the humanitarian disaster unfolding in the Mediterranean, does this mean EU states will want to pull their vessels from EUNAVFOR and an anti-piracy mission that seems to have run its course? It will be interesting to see what happens when the mandate for EUNAVFOR is reconsidered in late 2016, but arguably there will be a growing logic to have EU naval capabilities pitched closer to home, especially given the fuzzy and contested maritime borders of the EU imperium.
Zielonka also points to the fundamental weakness of the EU as neomedieval polity to pressures from other great powers (America, Russia, and China) that can easily exploit the EU's diversity and polycentric decisionmaking (Zielonka 2013: 12 18 We might also speculate here that the EU, as a neo-medieval polity, could be more comfortable resorting to private commercial marine security actors more than the nation states, whose Navies and Coastguards are not keen to be done out of 'business'. This is less a question of private navies and security contractors at sea, but more likely the less-controversial providers of drones, imagery, logistics, and other types of support. This trend is already evident for land operations, and the neo-medieval approach would expect it to grow in the maritime domain as well (Gould 2015; White and Macleod 2008) .
Overall, the normative environment the EU faces is arguably more complex than ever, post-modern in style, and certainly not one that will be dominated by Europeans alone. It is very possible that growing Chinese, Brazilian, and Indian voices within UNCLOS epistemic communities might seek to change key features of that basic legal framework for the sea.
They may seek, for example, to reduce the scope for 'innocent passage of warships' or make EEZs into something more like territorial seas or change the definition of artificial Islands. Europe might be quite alone in such fraught negotiations, given America's formal absence from the UNCLOS framework.
In conclusion, the neo-Medieval framework helps bring a large dose of reality to the EU's MSS and serves as a useful corrective for what has been a rush to infer so much from just one very successful mission: operation Atalanta. Given that the EU as a polity remains widely viewed as ambiguous, confusing, and contingent in its stability and direction, should
we not expect the same from the EU's maritime security policy? 18 See: http://www.moas.eu/. The ex-military personnel are notably from the Maltese armed forces. Vessels include the Phoenix, which has been operational off the coast off Libya since May 2, 2015, replete with a leased drone. This vessel has been joined by a second boat, the Bourbon Argos, which has a rescue capacity of 700 people, and there is a third vessel, Dignity 1.
